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From Threat to Opportunity? Problems with
the Idea of a "Code of Conduct" for Land-
Grabbing
Saturnino Borras Jr.t & Jennifer Francott
I. INTRODUCTION
The past decades have seen the emergence of a "corporate social
responsibility agenda" in response to public and activist criticism of "the
impact of transnational corporations (TNCs) in developing countries and
on the environment."' This agenda has emerged against the backdrop of
shifting perceptions of how the market, the state, and civil society function
and ought to function.2 One prominent version of this agenda has been the
World Bank's advocacy of "good governance" as a "persuasive ethical
power that allows for [corporate] self-regulation, making it possible for
governments to intervene less intrusively and more efficiently in society."3
Voluntary adherence by corporations to good business practices and
ethical behavior is a cornerstone of this advocacy, and its most recent
incarnation arises in the arena of rural development, focusing on access to
land and taking the form of proposals for a Code of Conduct for land
deals.4
t Canada Research Chair in International Development Studies, Saint Mary's University,
Canada.
tt Researcher at the Transnational Institute (TNI), in Amsterdam.
1. Peter Utting, The Struggle for Corporate Accountability, 39 DEV. & CHANGE 959, 959 (2008).
2. Bridget O'Laughlin, Governing Capital? Corporate Social Responsibility and the Limits of
Regulation, 39 DEV. & CHANGE 945, 946 (2008).
3. Id. at 946.
4. See, e.g., FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N. (FAO) ET AL., PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE
AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT THAT RESPECTS RIGHTS, LIVELIHOODS AND RESOURCES (2010),
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTARD/214574-
1111138388661/22453321/Principles Extended.pdf; Joachim von Braun & Ruth Meinzen-
Dick, "Land Grabbing" by Foreign Investors in Developing Countries: Risks and Opportunities,
507
1
Borras and Franco: From Threat to Opportunity? Problems with the Idea of a "Code of Conduct" for Land- Grabbing
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2010
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
A convergence of global crises (financial, environmental, energy, food)
in recent years has been contributing to a dramatic revaluation of and rush
to control land, especially land located in the Global South. Transnational
and national economic actors from various business sectors (oil and auto,
mining and forestry, food and chemical, bioenergy, etc.) are eagerly
acquiring (or declaring their intention to acquire) large swaths of land on
which to build, maintain, or extend large-scale extractive and agri-
industrial enterprises. National governments (and private investors) in
"finance-rich, resource-poor" countries are looking to "finance-poor,
resource-rich" countries to help secure their own food and energy needs
into the future.5 To be sure, land in the Global South has been coveted for
multiple reasons, historically. But today, there is momentum building
behind an apparently newer idea: that long-term control of large
landholdings beyond one's own national borders is necessary to supply the
food and energy needed to sustain one's own population and society into
the future.
By all accounts, transnational transactions involving large volumes of
land in the Global South are on the rise. Various estimates place the total
lands already transacted at upwards of twenty and even thirty million
hectares between 2005 and mid-2009.6 Although just how much land has
actually changed hands remains unclear, initial evidence suggests a trend
that is likely to continue, propelled by "public-private partnerships."
Many of the reported transactions are real; others as yet remain only paper
allocations, while still others are more speculative in nature at this point in
time.7 Many are TNC-driven; others are (foreign) government-driven. But,
IFPRI POLICY BRIEF 13, at 2-3 (2009).
5. See von Braun & Meinzen-Dick, supra note 4; see also The Special Rapporteur on the
right to food, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier de Schutter, Large-Scale
Land Acquisitions and Leases: A Set of Minimurn Principles and Measures to Address the Hurnan
Rights Challenge, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/33/Add.2 (Dec. 22, 2009); Andrew Rice, Is There Such
a Thing as Agro-Tmperialism?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/22/magazine/221and-t.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
6. John Vidal, Fears for the World's Poor Countries as the Rich Grab Land to Grow Food, THE
GUARDIAN, July 3, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/jul/03/land-
grabbing-food-environment (last visited Apr. 12, 2010); Asia: Land Grabs Threaten Food Security,
IrinNews.org, June 10, 2009, http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspxReportld=84785 (last
visited Apr. 13, 2010); see also LORENZO COTULA ET AL., LAND GRAB OR DEVELOPMENT
OPPORTUNITY? AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAND DEALS IN AFRICA
(2009), available at http://www.ffad.org/pub/land/land-grab.pdf.; GRAIN, SEIZED! THE 2008
LAND GRAB FOR FOOD AND FINANCIAL SECURITY (2008), available at
http://www.grain.org/briefings files/landgrab-2008-en.pdf.
7. In Mozambique, for example, the government leased thirty thousand hectares of land
to Procana for sugarcane (ethanol) production for a ninety-nine year term. The land was
already long occupied by subsistence farmers and pastoralists and had also been named the
resettlement site for families that were displaced by the expansion of the Limpopo National
Park. DANIEL RIBEIRO & NILZA MATAVEL, JATROPHA! A SoCIO-ECONOMIC PITFALL FOR
MOZAMBIQUE 10 (2009); Jennifer Franco et al., Assumptions in the European Union Biofuels Policy:
Frictions with Experiences in Germany, Brazil and Mozambique, 37 J. PEASANT STUD. (forthcoming
2010) (manuscript at 24, on file with authors). Other examples can be found in the Cerrado
region of Brazil, an extremely high biodiversity area that has seen massive expansion of
sugarcane monocropping for ethanol in recent years. See Franco et al., supra (manuscript at 18,
on file with authors). Many more examples can be found in the online industry news outlet
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almost always, the transactions involve close partnerships (or collusion)
between foreign investors and the national governments that rule over the
lands in question, with the latter playing a key facilitative role in instituting
the enabling environment to make the transactions possible or brokering
the deals themselves. The phenomenon first came to light in the global
food-versus-fuel controversy that exploded when basic food prices spiked
in 2007-2008 amidst a global boom in biofuels production.8 Initiated by
government-business alliances in the Global North through the setting of
mandatory biofuel blending quotas in the transport sector, the biofuel
boom has proceeded with the active participation of national governments
in the South in anticipation of increased demand for energy crops.9
Governments in Latin America, Africa, and Asia have been brokering
international biofuel-related agreements and facilitating land deals to
enable TNCs to gain access to land needed to produce biofuel feedstocks
for export. In many cases, the land in question is formally classified as
state-owned public land and leased by the state to corporate biofuels
producers. The alarm was raised by civil society groups and transnational
networks, many already mobilized against the corporate-led biofuel boom,
who then linked the biofuel boom to the threat it posed to rural
communities and ecosystems.10 The term "global land grab" came into use
and the by-now-familiar, iconic image of (Northern) companies and
governments enclosing the commons, dispossessing peasants, and ruining
environments (in the South) gained new traction.
Today, however, the main narrative shaping this trend is undergoing
its own great transformation as it gets absorbed into mainstream
development-policy currents. The dominant storyline of land-grabbing as a
threat is slowly ceding ground to a new story line-that of the new land
deals as a potential opportunity for rural development, if they can be
harnessed properly so as to minimize or avoid possible negative social and
environmental effects. Prominent players promoting this emerging
narrative are the World Bank and the International Food Policy Research
Institute (IFPRI). Part and parcel of the shift in perspective is a growing
emphasis on bringing "multiple stakeholders" together to institute an
BIOFUELS DIGEST, http://www.biofuelsdigest.com (last visited Apr. 8, 2010), as well as in
reports produced by transnational activist networks such as Friends of the Earth and GRAIN.
See, e.g., the Food Crisis and the Global Land Grab Blog, http://farmlandgrab.org (last visited
Apr. 12, 2010).
8. On the biofuel boom controversy, see, e.g., SOFIA MONSALVE SUAREZ ET AL., AGROFUELS
IN BRAZIL: REPORT OF THE FACT-FINDING MISSION ON THE IMPACTS OF PUBLIC POLICIES
ENCOURAGING THE PRODUCTION OF AGROFUELS ON THE ENJOYMENT OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TO
FOOD, WORK AND THE ENVIRONMENT AMONG THE PEASANT AND INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES
AND RURAL WORKERS IN BRAZIL (2008); Eric Holt-Gim6nez & Annie Shattuck, The Agrofuels
Transition: Restructuring Places and Spaces in the Global Food System, 29 BULL. SCI., TECH. & SOC'Y
180 (2009).
9. Perhaps the most aggressive mandatory targeting has been by the European Union,
which legislated in early 2009 that twenty percent of all energy used in the EU and ten percent
of each Member State's transport fuel must come from renewable sources by the year 2020,
with most of this expected to come from biofuels. See Franco et al., supra note 7.
10. See, e.g., GRAIN, supra note 6.
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international "code of conduct" (CoC) for transnational land transactions,
as a key step toward crafting broader "win-win" development outcomes,
although the discourse itself continues to evolve." In this paper, we offer a
preliminary critique of this emerging attempt to reframe the phenomenon
of land-grabbing, with some emphasis on the proposal for an international
CoC in particular, and in the process, offer an alternative perspective on
some of the key underlying issues at stake.
Although an international CoC may be a worthy idea in principle, this
does not necessarily mean that it is a worthy idea in practice. In this
instance, our basic objection to the proposed CoC is not simply that it is not
sufficiently pro-poor in orientation. Rather, our objection is that the
proposed CoC is not essentially pro-poor in the sense of proceeding from a
social-justice driven analysis of the causes of (rural) poverty and the need
to protect and advance (rural) poor people's land access and property
interests. A social-justice-driven analysis would link the causes of rural
poverty to the current TNC-controlled global system of food-feed-fuel
production, distribution, and consumption, and its negative social and
environmental impacts. It would then ground the search for solutions in
the fundamental aim of protecting and advancing the land access and
property interests of working poor people. In our view, any effort to link
high standards of business practice with ethical behavior in (trans)national
land deals is unlikely to produce truly pro-poor outcomes if the primary
aim of the land transfer is not categorically to protect and advance the
land-access and property interests of working poor people. 12
Unfortunately, the primary aims of the proposed CoC for land deals lie
elsewhere.
II. "MAKING A VIRTUE OUT OF NECESSITY": THE NEW NARRATIVE OF LAND-
GRABBING
For the advocates of a CoC, the starting point for analysis of
contemporary land-grabbing or land deals is not the complex political
economy question of "who has [or ought to have] what rights, to which
land, for how long, and for what purposes."13 Nor is their starting point
the variable kinds of "development" that may be envisioned by
communities linked to the lands targeted by investors. Instead, the starting
point of advocates of the proposed CoC is a certain vision of successful
11. Alongside "code of conduct," the phrase "principles of responsible large-scale land
acquisition" is also being deployed. But even if the term used by its proponents is not always
(or even any longer) "code of conduct" per se, the basic idea is essentially the same. The core
notion that this kind of approach offers a "win-win solution" continues to characterize the
endeavor, as it has from the start.
12. Our understanding of a truly pro-poor land policy is discussed in more detail
elsewhere. See Saturnino Borras, Jr. & Jennifer C. Franco, Contemporary Discourses and
Contestations Around Pro-Poor Land Policies and Land Governance, 10 J. AGRARIAN CHANGE 1
(2010).




Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 13 [2010], Iss. 2, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol13/iss2/7
20101 Problems with a Code of Conduct for Land Grabbing
national capitalist economic development, along with an implicit belief that
rural poverty is the result of poor developing countries' failure to follow
this particular path. From this perspective, the main issue to be grappled
with is not a land problem, but an investment problem - finance-poor
countries saddled with anemic rural economies that need, but have not
been able to attract, more investment in their agricultural sectors.
According to proponents of a CoC, more investments in this sector would
create new farm and off-farm jobs, boost smallholder incomes (through
contract-growing schemes), facilitate transfers of new technologies in
production and processing (including biotechnology), increase production
of food crops for both domestic and overseas consumption, build up
infrastructure and improve access to basic services (e.g., health and
education) in rural areas, and open up new export opportunities to earn
foreign exchange. Given this view of the "problem," the phenomenon of
land-grabbing takes on a the character of an opportunity, rather than a
threat. This argument clearly frames the CoC proposal put forward by
IFPRI in April 2009, for example: "Because of the urgent need for greater
development in rural areas and the fiscal inability of the developing-
country governments to provide the necessary infusion of capital, large-
scale land acquisitions can be seen as an opportunity for increased
investment in agriculture."14
One of the explanations most often given for why there are not enough
investments coming into these rural economies is the lack of clear land
property rights, which discourages potential investors. In recent decades,
mainstream development institutions have become increasingly oriented
toward the promotion of (usually individual) private property rights in
land through mechanisms deemed to be financially and administratively
efficient.1s Driven in part by this orientation's obsession with technical land
mapping, new satellite imagery has revealed the existence of a large supply
of "reserve agricultural land" in many of the same regions where rural
poverty is most concentrated, especially Africa, but also parts of South
America and Asia. 16 This "reserve" land in particular, it is believed, could
be tapped to attract more investments in the agricultural sector, and.
indeed, some of it is already being tapped through the new land deals.
Meanwhile, during the debates over the controversial issue of the
promotion of biofuels through mandatory targeting polices, the notion of
the existence of much "reserve agricultural land" (located mainly in the
Global South) gained unprecedented prominence in biofuels policymaking
in the European Union, for example.17 This notion refers to land considered
by investors (or potential investors) and their allies (in government,
business, and the scientific-academic community in both the North and the
South) to be idle, marginal, or degraded.18 Such characterizations have
14. Von Braun & Meinzen-Dick, supra note 5, at 2.
15. Borras & Franco, supra note 12, at 3.
16. COTULA ET AL., supra note 6, at 59-60.
17. Conuission Directive 2009/28/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 140) 16 (EU).
18. See COTULA ET AL., supra note 6, at 62.
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profound policy significance because they appear to lessen the possible
conflicts between local food production and other land uses, especially
those involving agricultural exports. There is a growing belief that such
land could be rehabilitated if brought under cultivation, especially in ways
that make use of recent biotechnological innovations that are already (or
soon will be) available for both food and energy crop production and
processing.19 This idea in particular serves to make these land deals seem
less predatory and more beneficial for local communities and
environments in the host nations.20
While it has been in the past (and often still is) taken for granted by
governments and investors alike that the lands involved in these deals are
empty and/or unused, many academic research papers, policy studies, and
activist reports have shown that this is not the case. The notion of "reserve
agricultural land" appears to be broad and ambiguous enough to
accommodate all those who see its economic potential, even if they hold
diverse interpretations of its social and environmental importance. In this
context, ironically, the current proposal of a CoC for land deals reflects the
increasing political weight of recognizing the continuing and actual social
and environmental significance of land that may be labeled as marginal,
idle, or degraded.
One of the most distinctive features of the new narrative is precisely its
insistence upon the need to recognize the potential impacts of new
investments on vulnerable segments of the rural population and on fragile
ecosystems. This is clear in IFPRI's proposal:
In some cases, the land leases are justified on the basis that the land
being acquired by the foreign investor is "unproductive" or
"underutilized." In most instances, however, there is some form of
land use, often by the poor for purposes such as grazing animals
and gathering fuel wood or medicinal plants. These uses tend to be
undervalued in official assessments because they are not marketed,
but they can provide valuable livelihood sources to the poor.
Large-scale land acquisitions may further jeopardize the welfare of
the poor by depriving them of the safety-net function that this type
of land and water use fulfills. 2'
Such problems can be managed on this view, however. Foreign direct
investment through large-scale land acquisitions is still seen as the answer
despite the "risks"; in fact, on this view, it is because of the risks that some
kind of management mechanism is needed. What is important to note here
is that the implications of the new land deals for people and environments
are (re)framed as side effects of an essentially beneficial cure-they are
risks that can be managed in order to make possible a larger good. They
19. RENEWABLE FUELS AGENCY, THE GALLAGHER REVIEW OF THE INDIRECT EFFECTS OF
BIOFUELS PRODUCTION 66 (2008).
20. See Franco et al., supra note 7.
21. Von Braun & Meinzen-Dick, supra note 5, at 2.
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are not taken as direct impacts that are so severe and unjust that they call
into question the very validity of the cure - e.g., the land deals themselves
or the development model being pursued through this type of foreign
direct investment.
What are the "risks" of land grabs according to proponents of the new
narrative?22
World Bank risks IFPRI risks
* Neglect of land users * Loss of livelihoods
* Short-term speculation * Failure to keep promises (local jobs,
* Corruption facilities, compensation)
* Environmental harm * Absence of consultation (with affected
* Polarization and communities)
instability * Violent conflict over rights
* Undermining food * Loss of subsistence and safety-net
security functions of existing land uses
* Loss of biodiversity, carbon stocks
* Long-term ecological sustainability
problems
How then can these "risks" be managed or even avoided? For those
who recognize them but still see the need to encourage foreign direct
investment in the form of big land deals, one element of successful risk
avoidance or management involves ensuring the proper policy
environment in the host countries. Both the World Bank and JFPRJ give
attention to the larger policy environment, and in similar ways. A
beneficial policy environment would include: well-defined land rights and
authorities, with an emphasis on a private property rights system; clear
identification of land that is available and clear mechanisms for transfer of
public land rights; improved investment climates through rule of law and
contract security; evidence-based agricultural policies in relation to
incentives, markets, technologies, and rural infrastructure; facilitation of
contract-growing and out-grower schemes; enhanced market information
systems; improved knowledge and extension services (including rural
banking); and decentralized (community-based) negotiation. None of these
items is new; many have been on the agenda of mainstream development
institutions for years.
What is new is the other element of the proposed risk management: an
international CoC that would govern the making and keeping of
transnational land deals in ways that protect local people and
environments, while still allowing them to be profitable in the conventional
sense. This is the "magic bullet" in the new narrative on land-grabbing: the
inauguration of an international "code of conduct" mechanism, whereby
all "stakeholders" can come together and make agreements based on
22. See i .; Kdaus Demniger, Land Grabbing: International Connmity Response,
Presentation at Utrecht University (July 2009) (notes on file with author).
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predefined principles of acceptable behavior and outcomes. Here, the
proposal put forward by IFPRI, captured in the table below, is illustrative.
IFPRI's proposal for a CoC in land dealS 23
Transparency in Existing local landholders must be informed and
negotiations involved in negotiations over land deals. Free, prior,
and informed consent is the standard to be upheld.
Particular efforts are required to protect the rights of
indigenous and other marginalized ethnic groups. The
media and civil society can play a key role in making
information available to the public.
Respect for Those who lose land should be compensated and
existing rights rehabilitated to an equivalent livelihood. The
standards of the World Commission on Dams provide
an example of such policies.
Sharing of The local community should benefit, not lose,
benefits from foreign investment in agriculture. Leases are
preferable to lump-sum compensation because they
provide an ongoing revenue stream when land is
taken away for other uses. Contract farming or out-
grower schemes are even better because they leave
smallholders in control of their land but still deliver
output to the outside investor. Explicit measures are
needed for enforcement if agreed-upon investment or
compensation is not forthcoming.
Environmental Careful environmental impact assessment and
sustainability monitoring are required to ensure sound and
sustainable agricultural production practices that
guard against depletion of soils, loss of critical
biodiversity, increased greenhouse gas emissions, or
significant diversion of water from other human or
environmental uses.
Adherence to When national food security is at risk (for instance,
national trade in case of an acute drought), domestic supplies should
policies have priority. Foreign investors should not have the
right to export during an acute national food crisis.
This type of two-pronged approach (favorable policy environment plus
an international CoC), it is declared, offers the best chance for the big land
deals to lead to "win-win" outcomes for all concerned. A win-win outcome
is one in which the development needs of both the resource-poor countries
and resource-rich countries are met, while at the same time the investors'
needs and interests (i.e. profits) are served and poor people's incomes and
livelihoods are enhanced. What the resource-poor countries need are
secure supplies of food and fuel in order to sustain their current patterns of
23. VON BRAUN & MEINZEN-DICK, supra note 5, at 3-4.
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food consumption and production. What the resource-rich countries need
are new investments in agriculture that would create jobs, support small
farmers, and bolster exports. What investors need is an improved, clear,
stable, and secure investment climate (indeed, clear property rights to
secure investments). In this way, as IFPRI puts it, "virtue" can be made out
of "necessity." 24
In theory, the application of a CoC in this context might seem to be
relevant and beneficial, or at the very least, harmless. One might expect
that applying the technique in this case would not do any further harm
than is already being done by the illicit land grabs themselves. Would it
not be beneficial for society to bring untapped (or under-tapped) land
under cultivation if it could be done in ways that do not undermine local
rights, threaten local food security, or harm the environment? Would it not
be useful to have clarification on land ownership and use rights? And
would it not be useful to have agreement on different stakeholders'
responsibilities (and not just their rights)? If the essential value of
institutions is that they establish rules where previously there were none,
thus making it possible to regulate behavior and outcomes, thereby
establishing order out of chaos, then would not the current global land
rush be just the kind of situation where instituting a CoC would be
especially appropriate?
We now turn to some of the problematic aspects of this proposed win-
win formula as a response to the global land rush and offer some of our
preliminary doubts and concerns.
III. PROBLEMS, DOUBTS, AND CONCERNS
First, proposals for a CoC for land deals necessarily operate within and
seek to sustain or extend the existing global industrial agro-food and
energy complex. Positing a CoC as an overarching framework in response
to globalized land-grabbing therefore does not address serious problems
associated with the extractive mining of land (and water) in the Global
South to meet the food and energy demands of industrialized countries
and to sustain corporate profits. It explicitly or implicitly assumes that
there is no fundamental problem with existing industrial food and energy
production and consumption patterns tightly controlled by TNCs. It
ignores the possibility that the food and energy investments brought about
by the recent mega land deals will not solve the food and energy crises in
the world and might even worsen them. At the same time, it a priori
dismisses the possibility of other development pathway options and
ignores the clamor of those who believe that other pathways are possible -
and better-and are either working toward or attempting to actualize
them.25
24. See von Braun & Meinzen-Dick, supra note 5, at 3.
25. Several transnational and global-regional networks of poor peasants and small
farmers have embraced the alternative vision of food sovereignty, with their member
organizations working toward achieving this vision, albeit with varying degrees of progress
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Second, the CoC is being promoted in tandem with the notion of the
existence of "reserve agricultural land," combined with images of agri-
industrial systems playing a beneficial role in restoring degraded land to
health, utilizing marginal land more fully, and reinvigorating idle land. In
addition to new satellite imagery (which does not picture people or their
historical land-based social relations and livelihood practices), the
assumption of "reserve land" is often based on standard nation-state
claims derived from official census data about land use and land property
relations, which are notoriously unreliable in many countries, for a variety
of reasons. The very notion of "reserve" more or less automatically renders
such land, by definition, "available," amenable to, and appropriate for
transformation into global granaries or new oil wells. And in the process,
other possible or actual uses are rendered "illegible" -a term we borrow
from James Scott, who examined how state officials reinterpret diverse
local societies in order to facilitate central state regulation and
administration.26 Historically, "seeing like a state" has involved
simplifying observed (local) social practices:
[L]ocal practices of measurement and landholding were "illegible"
to the state in their raw form. They exhibited a diversity and
intricacy that reflected a great variety of purely local, not state,
interests. That is to say, they could not be assimilated into an
administrative grid without either being transformed or reduced to a
convenient, if partly fictional, shorthand."27
Accepting the notion of reserve agricultural land necessarily consigns
existing local land-based social relations and practices that are diverse and
distinct to being vestiges of the past-to be acknowledged, but in the end,
not worthy of being taken seriously enough to protect and advance into the
future. They simply do not "fit" the economic development grid
envisioned by today's proponents of a CoC; they are not the beneficiaries
of the "responsible agricultural investment" that is envisioned.
Instead, based on past experience, what we can expect from this kind
of framing of land is more dispossession in the name of transforming
"marginal" land into economically productive spaces. When the Philippine
and success to date. The most prominent agrarian justice movement working along these lines
is La Via Campesina. See La Via Compesina, http://www.viacampesina.org (last visited Apr.
8, 2010). Meanwhile, similar trends can be seen in other kinds of networks, especially those
working with an environmental justice orientation, such as the African Biodiversity Network
and Friends of the Earth. Some of these same groups have also begun discussing the notion of
"energy sovereignty" in response to the fact that many areas where rural poverty is most
concentrated often suffer from lack of access to national electricity grids as well. This is the
case even in countries where energy produced through mega-dams, coal-mining, or large-
scale monocropping is mostly exported or diverted to cities for industrial use, as in
Mozambique, for example.
26. See JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: How CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE
HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 24 (1998).
27. Td. (emphasis added).
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government promised 1.4 million hectares of "marginal" lands to China,
they were referring to areas officially catalogued as "public" (and therefore
considered marginal), but in fact populated by both indigenous and non-
indigenous communities engaged in a variety of land-based livelihoods.
Elsewhere, it is traditional land-extensive pastoralist livelihoods that tend
to be subsumed under the category of "marginal" land, as in the case of the
Procana sugarcane ethanol project in Mozambique. 8 The expansion into
the already fragile Amazon frontier by soya monocropping is also being
justified partly in the name of making "marginal" lands economically
"productive," as if no other use or purpose could be considered productive
or sufficiently productive. 29 Moreover, the rehabilitation of so-called
"degraded" lands often comes in the form of industrial monocropping that
is portrayed as environmentally friendly, but actually undermines the
lands ecologically (e.g., industrial tree monocropping, including palm oil
and eucalyptus plantations, is now often referred to as "reforestation").
Third, advocates of a CoC argue that without clear land property rights
(usually taken as individual and private), the "risk" of dispossession is
high. Implicit here is a belief that having formal land property rights
(usually individual and private land rights) removes this risk and serves as
a guarantee that people will not be displaced and dispossessed by these
large-scale land deals. Such a view converges with years of mainstream
advocacy for the privatization of the remaining commons and
formalization of land rights, targeting public lands worldwide.
Yet this view is deeply flawed. There is much evidence to show that
formal land property rights are no guarantee against dispossession, and
they even often appear at the leading edge of it. The introduction of formal
land property rights first requires answering in practice (in power-
differentiated settings marked by conflicting interests) the complex series
of questions posed earlier in this discussion-who has (or should have)
what rights to which land for how long and for what purposes.30 Formal
land property rights are contested terrain, since they involve decisions
about who counts and who does not. Introducing formal rights for
28. See Borras & Franco, supra note 12, at 19.
29. For general comment on this transformation, see Saturnino M. Borras, Jr. & Jennifer C.
Franco, The Politics of Contemporary (Trans)national Commercial Land Deals: Competing
Views, Strategies and Alternatives, 13, 17-20 (Oct. 30, 2009), (unpublished manuscript
prepared for Agrarian Studies Colloquium Series, Yale University), available at
http://www.yale.edu/agrarianstudies/papers/08borras.pdf. It is difficult in the current
policy climate to find specific examples, since many companies have begun "green-washing"
their public statements. For example, Cargill, which has been quite controversial for its
expansion of soy monocropping into the Amazon rainforest, has stated that it is "supporting
cutting-edge research on how to rehabilitate degraded lands for agricultural use to increase
production and reduce habitat loss." CARGILL, 2007 CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP REVIEW: FINDING
THE RIGHT BALANCE 12 (2007). Elsewhere in that report, the company implies that expansion is
occuring in areas that were already deforested and that, in light of Brazil's "strict" Forest
Code, it is working with small farmers by supplying them with soybean for crushing to
restore old pasture to forest. Id. Although this not an explicit justification of expansion by
working to make the marginal more productive, it comes as close as one might expect from a
company that is under fire from social and environmental justice activists.
30. See Richards, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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indigenous landholders is not necessarily pro-poor in and of itself; but it
does "recalibrate the arena of struggle."31 Gaining legal recognition of poor
people's land rights has never alone guaranteed that they will actually be
respected and protected in the courts or on the ground; for the rural poor,
there remains a difficult and contested process involving struggles to
actually claim those rights and "make them real" in fact.32
In short, formal-legal land rights are formulated, interpreted, disputed,
and implemented by numerous state and non-state actors with their own
interests and embedded in power structures at multiple levels, and thus
can (and more often than not do) lead to outcomes that cannot be
considered pro-poor.33 Neither categorically pro-poor outcomes, nor even
"win-win" outcomes, are ever guaranteed.
Clear land property rights (private or otherwise) have certainly not
guaranteed win-win outcomes in many of the land deals, nor have they
automatically protected the rural poor from various forms of dispossession
or "adverse incorporation" into the food-fuel production enclaves. In
Mozambique, the rural poor have very clear land rights based on Land
Law 1997, but as the Procana case shows, they can still be expelled from
their land.34 In Brazil, the expansion of sugarcane ethanol production has
swallowed many land reform settlements, specifically in the SAo Paolo. In
Indonesia, clearer property rights requirements in contract farming
schemes do not always lead to the bright promise of oil palm plantation
expansion.
As Cotula and Vermeulen argue, using empirical material from Africa,
clear and secure land property rights are necessary but not sufficient to
guarantee protection of rural poor land rights.3 We agree. But we would
also add another critical point: secure property rights should not a priori,
only or always, mean private property rights; in many parts of the world,
an inductive approach is needed that is based on a deep understanding of
the societies where intervention is targeted and "makes socially legitimate
occupation and use rights, as they are currently held and practiced, the
point of departure for both their recognition in law and for the design of
institutional frameworks for mediating competing claims and
administering land."36
31. SUZANA SAWYER & EDMUND TERENCE GOMEZ, U.N. RES. INST. Soc. DEV.,
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNMENTALITY AND RESOURCE EXTRACTION: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES,
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE STATE 3 (2008).
32. There is a growing literature on the difficult challenges of "making rights real" in the
case of land. See, e.g., Ben Cousins, Hoo Do Rights Become Real? Formal and Informal Institutions
in South Africa's Land Reform, 28 INT'L DEV. STUD. BULL., Oct. 1997, at 59 (discussing land
reform in South Africa); Jennifer C. Franco, Making Land Rights Accessible: Social Movements and
Political-Legal Innovation in the Rural Philippines, 44 J. DEV. STUD. 991 (2008) (discussing land
reform in the Philippines).
33. See Borras & Franco, supra note 12.
34. See supra note 7.
35. Lorenzo Cotula & Sonja Vermeulen, Over the Heads of Local People: Consultation, Consent
and Reconpense in Large-Scale Land Deals for Biofuels Projects in Africa, 37 J. PEASANT STUD.
(forthcoming July 2010).
36. Ben Cousins, More Than Socially Embedded: The Distinctive Character of "Communal
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Fourth, the assumption that land transactions among "multi-
stakeholders" that are formal and transparent, and, to the extent possible,
decentralized-localized, are the solution to avoid negative consequences of
current mega land deals is only partly correct. Certainly, any land deal
should at least be transparent, but transparency does not necessarily
guarantee pro-poor outcomes. Transparency is not the same as
accountability, and transparent transactions do not necessarily guarantee
accountability, especially to poor "stakeholders".37 This insight partly helps
to explain the rise of a (trans)national accountability movement in recent
years. 8
Moreover, the question of representation of social groups, especially in
rural communities in the Global South, is problematic, uneven, and
politically contested -whether negotiations are transparent or not.39 In
many places, a minority elite section of a community often claims to
represent the poor even when it does not. On many occasions in many
countries, local elites forge formal contracts with investors in the name of
their communities despite having no real consultative process and
mandate. Often in such situations, the rural poor have little opportunity to
set the record straight, while other, more powerful, stakeholders have little
interest in ensuring that oppositional voices are even heard, much less
taken into consideration, if doing so could mean scuttling the deal
altogether. Different social groups join the negotiation table with different
degrees of political power. The power of unorganized pastoralists with no
organized mobilization and negotiation experience is likely to be no match
for transnational companies and government bureaucrats.
Finally, the World Bank has a special bias towards decentralized-
localized negotiations, as explained by Klaus Deininger. 40 But it is at the
local level that local elites and bureaucrats who stand to gain in new
investments can easily manipulate negotiation processes and where local
communities of the poor can easily be isolated from their potential national
allies. The persistence of widespread chronic rural poverty points to the
need to make social justice-driven rural democratization a major focus of
inquiry, advocacy, and policy intervention.41 The proposed CoC makes an
Tenure" Regimes in South Africa and !ts knplications for Land Policy, 7 J. AGRARIAN CHANGE 281
(2007).
37. See Jonathan Fox, Introduction to THE CHALLENGES OF RURAL DEMOCRATISATION:
PERSPECTIVES FROM LATIN AMERICA AND THE PHILIPPINES (Jonathan Fox ed., 1990).
38. Utting, supra note 1, at 960.
39. See generally THE CHALLENGES OF RURAL DEMOCRATISATION, supra note 37.
40. Deminger, supra note 22.
41. See JENNIFER FRANCO, TRANSNATIONAL INST., RURAL DEMOCRATISATION: (RE)FRAMING
RURAL POOR POLITICAL ACTION (2008), available at http://tni.org/paper/rural-democratisation-
reframing-rural-poor-political-action (building on the work of THE CHALLENGES OF RURAL
DEMOCRACY, supra note 37, and John Gaventa, Exploring Citzenship, Participation and
Accountability, 33 IDS BULL. 1 (2002), among others). Here, rural democratization is understood
as a long and difficult process that involves struggles to build social and political
organizations capable of representing the diverse interests of the rural poor and amplifying
their voices in public policy processes, including development-related decision making that
affects their lives. It involves struggles to increase state accountability to excluded or
marginalized members of the rural working poor population. This includes struggles to
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end run around the much deeper issue of democratizing the rural political
arena, including development-related decision-making that profoundly
affects people's lives, by imposing one particular view of appropriate
economic development as the end goal.
Fifth, inherent in a CoC is the voluntary nature of agreements.
Violations are difficult to pin down; violators are impossible to make
accountable. Even where there is formal adherence by the parties
concerned to the principles of free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC),
these principles are rarely observed and enforced in practice, and it would
take much political power, time, and resources to ensure that they were.
Sawyer and Gomez have observed the paradox that, simultaneously with
an increase in and institutionalization of international treaties, voluntary
guidelines, and FPIC principles intended to protect indigenous peoples,
there have been unprecedented violations of the rights of indigenous
peoples and the penetration of their territories worldwide.42
Sixth, "partnership" is also a key concept in a CoC. It comes in many
component forms, including state/ private-sector/ civil-society
partnerships, which are assumed to promote transparency and build win-
win outcomes into any land deals. But such a notion of partnership is
usually based on a depoliticized and unrealistic vision of engagement
between various actors that strips them of possibly conflicting interests and
attempts to place them on equal footing. Imagining equal footing and
complementary interests where none exist is more likely than not to lead to
the poor losing out. Another type of partnership is the "TNC-farmer"
partnership, also known as contract farming, where peasant producers are
incorporated into the global agri-industrial food/energy complex through
a variety of contractual arrangements. It is perhaps the most commonly
cited type of incorporation of poor peasants and small farmers into large-
scale agri-industrial schemes and is thought to result in win-win scenarios.
Over time and in many diverse settings, however, this has proved not to be
the case. Instead, such arrangements generally result in processes and
outcomes that mainly favor the transnational companies, while, in some
instances, they have even become an excuse to engage in forest clearing
and monocropping.
In short, part and parcel of CoC proposals is an uncritical belief in the
basic beneficence of formalistic and legalistic measures such as clearer
contracts, clearer and more secure property rights (usually interpreted as
private and individual rights), transparent contracting, FPIC, and state-
civil society partnership. Each of these, in itself, is not necessarily bad; each
could have merit depending on a particular context. But none is inherently
good in that none can guarantee truly pro-poor outcomes. In the absence of
a clear framework and process that insists on prioritizing truly pro-poor
effectively claim their rights and the right to decide what kind of development is to be
pursued in their name. From this perspective, "development" may still be the answer to rural
poverty, but it is equally important who defines what kind of development and for what
purposes development is pursued.
42. SAWYER & GOMEZ, supra note 31, at 17.
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outcomes, the weaknesses of these various elements are more likely to be
reinforced when framed within a win-win, voluntary CoC as the response
to the global land grab.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The proposed CoC-framed response to the global land grab veers away
from questioning the fundamental roots of land-grabbing, i.e., the existing
industrial pattern of food and energy production and consumption
controlled by TNCs, while engaging in the problematic notion of win-win
scenarios. In our view, for all the reasons outlined above, a CoC-framed
response to land-grabbing is likely to facilitate, not block, further land-
grabbing and thus should not be considered, even as a second-best
approach. Some may argue that the proposed CoC, despite its inherent
weaknesses, should still be considered as a possible second-best, pragmatic
approach on the grounds that large-scale land-grabbing is inevitable in the
current economic climate and political-institutional context. Yet we
contend that land-grabbing is not inevitable, that it can be prevented, and
that concerted efforts should be undertaken to stop it. Doing so, however,
will require an appropriate (re)alignment of political forces at the
international, national, and local levels, mobilized within a human rights
framework.
Prioritizing truly pro-poor outcomes would require adopting a human
rights-based approach, including taking seriously the right to food and the
right to land.43 Elsewhere we have elaborated on the need to specify the
43. There is no explicit human right to land in international human rights law, and
consequently the obligations related to access to land have not yet been fully determined. The
"right to property" was established in international human rights law in Article 17 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), G.A. Res. 217A, art. 17, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., lstplen. Mtg., U.N.Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948), but it was not codified in the subsequent
(legally binding) international conventions on economic, social, and cultural rights and on
civil and political rights. This was because of a lack of consensus at the time and during the
deliberations over the conventions. However, according to Sofia Monsalve of the human
rights organization Foodfirst Information and Action Network (FIAN-Int'l):
Even though there is no human right to land, the right to land of rural
communities is implied in other human rights recognized in international
covenants, such as the right to property, the right to self-determination,
the right of ethnic minorities to enjoy and develop their own culture, as
well as the right to an adequate standard of living.
Sofia Monsalve, Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Progresses, State of the
Debate, RIGHT To FOOD J., Dec. 2003. There are an increasing number of relevant international
legal instruments, mainly on the human right to food, which lend support to the idea of a
human right to land and to other productive resources, and which emphasize vulnerable
people as the main rights-holders. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (ECESCR, art. 11, G.A. Res 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 1496th plen.
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. &
Cultural Rights, General Conment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5
(May 12, 1999), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/ (Symbol)/
3d02758c707031d58025677f003b73b9?Opendocument; FAO, Working Group on the Right to
Adequate Food, Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to
Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security 25 (Nov. 2004), available at
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key features of a human-rights framed, categorically pro-poor land policy
framework, which are also relevant here. Two of these key features are
protection or transfer of land-based wealth in favor of the poor and transfer
of land-based political power. A pro-poor land policy framework must also
be: (i) class-conscious to ensure the policy (or measures) benefits the
landless and near-landless working classes; (ii) historical so as to allow a
"social justice" framework to be fully developed; (iii) gender-sensitive to
promote the distinct right of women to their own land rights; (iv) ethnicity-
sensitive to promote the distinct right of ethnic groups (and other race and
caste-related groupings) to their territorial claims as peasants and as
peoples; (v) productivity-increasing to support more intensive land and
labor use; (vi) livelihood-enhancing to support the building of diverse and
sustainable livelihoods; and finally (vii) rights-securing to advance the
rights of poor people to occupy and use land for purposes and in ways of
their own choosing.44
A human rights-based framework necessarily calls into question the
broader pattern of food-energy production and consumption that drives
the current global land grab, embeds an analysis of it within the dynamics
of multi-class and group power relations in affected communities, and
opposes displacement/ dispossession as well as adverse incorporation of
poor people into the emerging agri-industrial food-energy enclaves in the
Global South. A comprehensive human rights-based framework has
fundamental differences with the more corporate-controlled and profit-
driven CoC framework and sets a high bar for evaluating processes and
their outcomes. The position by UN Special Rapporteur on the right to
food, Olivier de Schutter, is relevant. Concerned about the human rights
implications of this new trend where "[pirivate investors, including
investment funds, are increasingly attracted to agriculture, and
increasingly speculate on farmland," the Special Rapporteur is "seek[ing]
to provide guidance to ensure that these investment agreements do not
lead to violations of the human right to adequate food." 45 If human rights
are taken seriously, such a position could serve as a basis for a radical
critique of the CoC position and for a more powerful and truly pro-poor
response to the global land grab. It could incorporate some of the
http://www.fao.org/righttofood/publi09/y9825e00.pdf. According to FIAN:
State Parties to ICESCR are obligated to respect, protect and fulfill access
to land, given that this forms part of the basic content of the right to food
and is particularly important for peasants, indigenous peoples,
fisherfolks, pastoralists, and people living in rural areas and who have no
alternative options for earning a living. The Special Rapporteur on the
Right to Food has already adopted this interpretation and considers it to
be clear that governments should respect, protect and fulfill access to
land.
SOFIA MONSALVE SUAREz, FIAN INT'L, ACCESS TO LAND AND PRODUCTIVE RESOURCES:
TOWARDS A SYSTEMATIC INTERPRETATION OF THE FAO VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES ON THE RIGHT
TO FOOD 2 (2006) (emphasis added).
44. Borras & Franco, supra note 12; see also Jennifer Franco, Pro-Poor Policy Reforms and
Governance in State/Public Lands: A Critical Civil-Society Perspective, 1 LAND REFORM 8 (2009).
45. The Special Rapporteur on the right to food, supra note 5, 1.1 .
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individual elements in the CoC proposition, specifically, FPIC and
transparent processes and contracts, and deepen their significance.
A human rights-based response to global land-grabbing can gain
traction only through a concerted effort by state and non-state actors
operating at international, national, and local levels. It is less useful to use
categories such as "multilateral agencies," "civil society," or "farmers'
movements," because these are highly differentiated entities. For
multilateral and bilateral agencies, it is useful to speak of reformist factions
within that can support a human rights framework. Civil society is varied;
some groups are supportive of the CoC, while others are not and are
pushing for a human rights framework. Farmers' movements are also
divided between those that see the biofuel boom as an opportunity (e.g.,
the International Federation of Agricultural Producers) and are also likely
to support a CoC framework, and those, like La Via Campesina, that see
the biofuel boom as a threat and oppose a CoC. These fault lines among
key forces at the international level also exist at the national and local levels
(for example, national ministries should be seen as politically contested
arenas, rather than monolithic entities). The challenge is not to look for
alliances of undifferentiated entities, but to look into divisions and fault
lines within and between these groups, in order to mobilize the forces that
will opt for a human rights framework rather than a CoC as a response to
global land-grabbing. The key is to forge alliances between reformist
initiatives from above -reformists within state and inter-governmental
institutions -along with widespread, consistent mass mobilizations by
affected rural poor and movements and allies among civil society from
below; indeed, a multi-level "sandwich" strategy.
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